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Abstract 
 
A concept for a novel track switch arrangement has been developed at Loughborough University, which, 
through a novel locking arrangement, allows parallel, multi-channel actuation and locking functions for the 
first time. This switch has been developed as part of the REPOINT project, and is referred to as the REPOINT 
switch. Existing track switches generally use a single-channel actuator and lock, and undergo an intensive 
maintenance and inspection regime to ensure an acceptable level of reliability/availability. This paper 
demonstrates, through mathematical modelling with very conservative assumptions, that an increase in switch 
availability is possible alongside a corresponding decrease in ongoing maintenance intensity using the 
REPOINT multi-channel approach. The paper firstly introduces the theory behind the design of the REPOINT 
switch, using a switch with 2-out-of-3 redundant actuation and sensing channels as an example. An existing 
switch is analysed using real-world data as a benchmark. Availability is determined by the target time in which 
Maintenance Teams must have replaced any failed components, expressed herein as τ. Availability measures 
are obtained as functions of τ which show the range of possible switch availability against maintenance 
response times, for the given set of assumptions. The results show that for a REPOINT installation, gains in 
system availability are possible even when response times are set many times longer than current standards, 
indicating a significant reduction in ongoing maintenance cost. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is commonplace in industries with safety critical or performance critical systems to replicate key components in 
order to increase whole-system life and reduce failure rates as per Isermann (2006). A project at Loughborough 
University called REPOINT has devised a novel arrangement for a railway track switch following this concept, 
described in Wright et al (2014) and in GB Patent 1322660. This new architecture of track switch enables 
multi-channel actuation to be used to provide improved switch performance in a way that is not possible with 
conventional switches. ‘Performance’, in this instance, refers to reduced lifecycle cost, increased availability, and 
improved maintainability. Alongside corresponding changes to the signalling system, it may allow for more capacity 
through existing junction layouts, when taken alongside signalling changes which allow a turnout to be treated more 
like plain line, in Bemment et al (2013). The design also eliminates several of the more common failure modes of 
traditional track switches. The architecture includes a condition monitoring scheme, which is designed to automatically 
reconfigure the control algorithm to isolate suspected faulty components, and enables the ongoing use of the switch 
with minimal degradation in performance until a repair becomes feasible. General arrangements of a traditional switch 
as presented by Morgan (2009), and a contrasting REPOINT switch are shown in Fig.1, described later. 
The concept of replication of critical components in a system generally improves theoretical reliability; however 
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achieving the same in application requires consideration of human and economic factors. The fitment of a REPOINT 
switch is envisioned as part of a rail industry wide trend of moving to true condition-based maintenance, eliminating 
the need for regular and unrequired human intervention or inspection as in Bemment et al (2015), and Wright et al 
(2014). The asset manager must then decide on the required availability of the switch, which is determined by the target 
time in which Maintenance Teams must have replaced any failed components, expressed herein as τ. As τ decreases, the 
associated ongoing maintenance cost increases as more teams must be kept on standby, thus 1/τ, or ‘maintenance 
intensity’, can be taken as a general indication of the relative cost of maintenance. No attempt is made herein to 
quantify 1/τ in monetary terms as this value would be unique to the particular maintenance team arrangements at each 
specific locality. 
This paper demonstrates, through mathematical modelling and conservative assumptions, that an increase in switch 
availability is possible alongside a corresponding decrease in ongoing maintenance intensity using the REPOINT 
multi-channel approach. The paper firstly introduces the theory behind the design of the REPOINT switch, using a 
switch with 2-out-of-3 redundant actuation and sensing channels as an example. A benchmark existing switch is 
analysed using data from real-world scenarios. Availability measures are obtained as functions of τ which show the 
range of possible switch availability against maintenance response times, for the given set of assumptions. The results 
show that for a REPOINT installation, gains in system availability are possible even when response times are set many 
times longer than current standards, indicating a significant reduction in ongoing maintenance cost. 
 
2. Operational Reliability and Asset Management Measures 
 
It is necessary to distinguish between the mean time between unsafe failures (i.e. system in an unsafe state), and the 
mean time between operational failures. Literature, especially industrially-focussed documents, can cause confusion by 
representing either by the term ‘MTBF’ or ‘MTTF’ (Meant Time Between/To Failure). The distinction is made here 
between MTBF, the mean time between unsafe failures, and MTBOF (Mean Time Between Operational Failures), 
which describes how often the system can be expected to suffer a failure which interrupts operations. The latter would 
generally be expected to be substantially lower, and reflects the service quality that the system must provide. This 
concept is explored by Goodall et al (2006), with further mathematical modelling work on the reliability of ‘k-out-of-N’ 
systems discussed in Dwyer et al (2011). To make this distinction for railway track switching systems specifically, the 
MTBF would be required to be of a level of a modern high-integrity system, around SIL-4 (108 – 109 hours) – i.e. so 
high that one would not normally expect to encounter a failure within the working life of the population for systems the 
size of a railway network (see Standard BS:EN61508 for a further discussion of SIL levels and their calculation). 
However, the MTBOF – the mean time to a switch failure causing network disruption – is much lower, and of the order 
of 104 - 105 hours, as can be observed from Table 2. In practice, if a single fault causes an unsafe condition in any 
system then some level of functional replication or redundancy is essential. This will usually ensure a satisfactory level 
of safety but always compromises reliability in some manner. The formula MTBF/(MTBF + MTTR) takes account of 
repair time to predict system availability, but this is different from operational availability because, for a fault-tolerant 
system with redundancy, operation continues while the repair is being effected. It should be emphasised that the basic 
elements in the track switching system are Line Replaceable Units (LRUs). These will not be repaired: there will be a 
stock of functioning units that maintenance engineers can use to replace the faulty/failed unit (which may subsequently 
be repaired in the background). This paper continues to use the word `repair’, even though in practice it will usually 
mean ‘replace’. 
Accepting that the MTBF cannot be relaxed for safety reasons, there is still scope to provide an improved MTBOF 
by improving the track switching system and its associated maintenance practices. This may, or may not, come at 
additional financial cost. Mathematical modelling can be used to provide an indication of the potential change in 
MTBOF versus cost for a given set of maintenance regimes. Traditional reliability modelling of a system may deliver 
results which are somewhat abstracted from the realities of the day-to-day operation of a railway. The modelling herein 
takes a railway asset management perspective, in that the primary controlled variable is one which can be directly 
affected by the asset manager to bring about the level of availability required of the asset. This variable is τ, which 
describes the target time period in which a failed (or isolated as identified faulty) unit must be replaced by a 
maintenance team to deliver a given system MTBOF. Repair times are assumed to follow some general distribution 
f(τ).  
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3. Track Switching Practice (UK) 
 
 Track switching, in UK signalling practice is extensively discussed in literature relating to the design - 
Morgan (2009), maintenance - Cope and Ellis (2002) and operation - Hadaway (1950) of switches. Switches are 
actuated remotely by electro-mechanical devices, of various designs, which are responsible for the setting of the switch 
blades, their locking in position, and the communication of that position back to the controlling system and therefore 
the operator. A arrangement of device and moving rails is shown in Fig. 1. These devices can be situated many miles 
from available maintenance/response teams. Any system failure, whilst not necessarily a safety risk due to the inbuilt 
controls and associated operational procedure, causes much disruption to the network whilst a team is despatched to 
repair the system. This disruption is magnified where no diversionary route around the failed switch can be established, 
an increasingly common occurrence as the switch population is minimised by infrastructure operators in order to cut 
costs.  
 
To counter any failures, switches undergo a labour-intensive maintenance programme. A typical set of maintenance 
interventions (UK) is shown in Table 2. More recent efforts include an extensive rollout of basic remote condition 
monitoring equipment since 2009 with much academic input into algorithm design, for instance in Silman and Roberts 
(2010). This effort has, in part, been responsible for a downward trend of switch failures over the intervening period, 
which can be observed in Table 1. However, whilst this downward trend may have caused a corresponding falling trend 
in reliability fines to the infrastructure owner, it does not correspond to a downward trend in maintenance costs. This is 
because the switches are now subject to periodic and condition based maintenance, primarily because the condition 
monitoring technology is not capable of monitoring the state of all safety-critical elements of the switch, necessitating 
the continuation of regular human inspection. For a conventional switch all significant failures create an unsafe 
condition and are therefore accommodated at a system level by the signalling system, i.e. an operational failure because 
functional redundancy in the switch itself is not possible. However the functional redundancy enabled by REPOINT 
means that an operational failure is when there is only one good actuation channel remaining. The balance of 
probability is that the single remaining actuator will probably still be working, but a single further failure is unsafe. 
Herein is the subtle distinction between MTBF and MTBOF, as defined in Section 2.  
      
 
4. The Repoint Project 
            
An ongoing project at Loughborough University, called ‘REPOINT’, has devised a novel architecture of track 
switch which allows multi-channel actuation of the movable track elements. The engineering detail of this design is 
omitted here for brevity, but is provided in several previous publications as cited above. The locking function is 
provided passively, such that each actuator can operate the switch alone, and with no performance degradation, with 
other channels isolated. A 1-in-3 schema is provided for analysis herein, but it is possible that the number of actuation 
channels could be adjusted for the requirements of a particular junction/route. Local condition monitoring is able to 
isolate any single unit in the event of a suspected fault. Each individual actuator is designed to have a standardised and 
line replaceable active element which can be exchanged trackside in the order of 2 minutes. These features open up the 
possibility of a truly condition-based maintenance regime. One option, explored here, is that two channels are required 
to actuate the switch, and provide reliable position feedback. Three channels are provided, whereby if a fault was 
suspected the faulty channel is immediately isolated and the other two could continue operation with performance 
unaffected. The active elements in the first channel could then be replaced at will by a passing maintenance team. A 
failure of a second channel, during the downtime of the first, would cause an operational failure, as defined in section 2.  
 
A 384mm gauge demonstrator of this concept is currently operational in a laboratory at Loughborough University, 
UK, and is shown in Fig. 2.    
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Fig. 1  Traditional (A) switch arrangement and proposed REPOINT (B) switch arrangement.  1 
Stock Rails; 2  Moveable Switch Rails; 3 Stretcher Bars; 4 Common Crossing; 5 Check 
Rails; 6 Straight Route; 7 Turnout Route; 8 POE (Points Operating Equipment), line-side type 
shown; 9 Drive Bar and Drive Stretcher ; 10 Detection Rods, 11 Supplementary Sensor. 
 
Fig. 2  Photograph of the 384mm gauge demonstrator in the laboratory at Loughborough University 
 
Bemment et al., Proceedings of International Symposium on Speed-up and Sustainable Technology 
 for Railway and Maglev Systems 2015, November 10-12, 2015, Chiba, JAPAN 
Proc. of STECH 2015                                                      © 2015 The Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers 
 5 
Table 1: Incident count for infrastructure assets between 2017-2012 upon UK mainline, for top 18 incident categories (by 
count), including mean number of ‘delay minutes’ incurred per incident. Source: Office of Rail Regulation (2013)  
 
Infrastructure Incident Count Ic   Mins/Incident 
type 08-09  09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 Mean  Mean 
Track 7750 6665 5879 5519 5346 5997 6193 137 
Speed Restrictions 1428 1278 932 717 685 747 965 122 
Track Faults 6322 5387 4947 4802 4661 5250 5228 139 
Non-Track 32001 30109 27157 25767 25121 25491 27608 97 
Points 8022 7118 5803 5162 5021 4376 5917 106 
Level Crossings 2261 2162 2003 1932 1857 1936 2025 49 
OLE/Third Rail 1458 1241 1281 1276 1265 1259 1297 205 
Signals 6559 6202 5116 5018 4449 4278 5270 48 
Track Circuits 5381 5145 4567 4243 3902 3729 4495 123 
Axle Counters 1096 913 648 683 706 799 808 117 
Signalling/Power 3750 4016 4422 4202 4494 4684 4261 114 
Other Signalling 1495 1430 1513 1505 1300 1338 1430 41 
Telecoms 1406 1352 1252 1176 1513 2406 1518 46 
Cables 573 530 552 570 614 686 588 281 
Other 12633 9303 9084 9212 9289 10753 10046 74 
Structures (Civils) 397 436 385 279 444 574 419 253 
Other Infra. 5478 3772 3455 3774 3612 4739 4138 62 
Track Patrols 3362 2565 2269 1949 2213 2075 2406 16 
Mishaps 1839 1183 1493 1838 1836 2009 1700 93 
Fires 197 221 250 257 116 218 210 145 
Bridge Strikes 1360 1126 1232 1115 1068 1138 1173 129 
Total 52384 46077 42120 40498 39756 42241 43846 97 
 
 
 
Table 2: Typical scheduled maintenance operations for UK switch installations, and total labour time. Note labour time does 
not include travel to site. Source: Network Rail/Interview. 
 
 
ID Type Interval 
Intervention 
time 
(Hours) (tm) 
Possession 
Required 
1 Track Component Inspection Weekly 0.1 No 
2 Track Gauging, Adjustment 4-weekly 1 No 
3 Track Element Renewals 5-yearly 10 Yes 
4 Signalling 'A' Service 4-weekly 1 No 
5 Signalling 'B' service 13-weekly 1 No 
6 Signalling 'C' Service Yearly 4 Yes 
7 Location Case Inspection 13-weekly 1 No 
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5. Modelling Operational Reliability – Traditional Switches 
 
5.1 Establishing a Baseline 
 
In order to provide a comparator for the modelling of the Repoint switch, there first needs to be estimated 
some baseline figures for switches as currently deployed. This estimate can, in the first instance, come from the data 
provided in Table. 1 and Table. 2. The population of UK switches is 21602 (2013).  
 
 MTBOF = (Population/ Ic_mean )* Hours_in_year     (1) 
  = (21602 / 5917) * 8766 
  = ~32003hrs (~3.65 years) 
 
There are two significant unknown variables for further calculation.  
Firstly, the actual repair time for operational failures (i.e. the time the switch is unavailable following a 
failure in use). For this modelling exercise, the mean number of ‘delay minutes’ per incident will be used. Delay 
minutes are a measure used in the UK to establish the severity of impact upon the network due to an asset failure. The 
calculation, and attribution, of delay minutes to particular faults is not through a particularly scientific process, but the 
mean magnitudes provided in Table. 1 provide a good first estimate. This repair time includes transit to site for 
emergency responses only.  
Secondly, the transit time tt of maintenance teams to site is unknown, and may be widely variable depending 
on the particular switch, depot location, time of day (e.g. rush hour) team utilisation, etc. From interviews with network 
operators, it has been established that 1 hour per switch is a typical figure. This has previously been modelled as a 
Poisson distribution, as per Rausand and Hoyland (2004), but as the goal is a benchmark figure this mean value has 
been assumed. Note transit time is not included for item number 1 in Table. 2, as the weekly visual inspection is part of 
the ‘track walk’ conducted by operations staff, therefore transit time is essentially zero. Availability is indicated by 
considering the sum of downtime (delay minutes incurred, from Table 1) from operational failures and scheduled 
maintenance (where the asset is out of use, ‘under possession’ only), as: 
 
Availability  = (MTBOF / (MTBOF + MTTR)) - ∑(tm_peryear/ Hours_in_year)  (2a) 
    = (32003 / (32003 + 1.77)) – (6 / 8766)    (2b) 
   = 0.999260 
 
This availability is alternatively termed “three nines”, as there are three nines after the decimal point. It is achieved 
with a given direct given labour commitment time, consisting of the sum of time spent on interventions (tm_peryear of 
given frequency Fi, and associated transit time tt (where tt is multiplied by 2 to give out and back transit time). Note 
direct labour does not include management, overheads etc. Including emergency responses from above, this gives:  
 
Labour_time = Maintenance_time + Transit_time + Emergency_response_time (3a) 
= ∑Fi* tm_peryear + ∑Fi*2tt + ((1/MTBOF) * (MTTRhours + tt))  (3b) 
  = 45.20 + 35.20 + 0.62     (3c) 
  = ~81 hours/year 
 
 
5.2 Discussion: Variables and Limiting Factors 
  
The labour value quoted in 5.1 is somewhat misleading in that it still relies upon teams being on standby to respond to 
faults within the prescribed 106 minutes; they are essentially still ‘working’ when on standby. Section 2 introduced τ, 
the time in which a maintenance team must fix any failed components, and return the switch to a functional state. For a 
system without parallel redundancy of mission-critical components, the system is safe but the asset is out of use during 
this period, and the target τ must be as small as possible as it is equivalent to MTTR. Eqn (2b) shows the relative 
importance of unscheduled and scheduled maintenance with regards the availability figure. Because MTTR is much 
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less than MTBOF there is a linear relationship between MTTR and availability. This relationship is shown in Fig. 3a. 
There is limited opportunity to relax τ whilst still maintaining “three nines” due to the relative frequency of failure, but, 
over 10h is achievable. However, unscheduled failures in the UK typically incur a monetary cost around 100x 
scheduled maintenance downtime (through performance-related fines) meaning this approach to cost saving would be 
counter-productive in practice. The number of teams required on standby for a given geographical area can be deduced 
from a Poisson distribution and is the subject of further work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3b shows that even by working to improve the MTBOF to the order of 10 years, the availability figure is 
plateauing well within the bounds of “three nines”. This is because the remaining unavailability is taken up by 
preventative maintenance practices, which are necessary for an asset which cannot be ‘run to failure’. This ceiling is of 
significance as it represents the practical performance limit of the traditional approach with a single actuator. Improving 
the MTBOF has been the subject of much academic and industrial work, for instance Silmon and Roberts (2010), yet 
this plot indicates returns are significantly diminishing as the gradient levels out beyond around 4 years MTBOF. 
 
 
6. Modelling Operational Reliability – REPOINT Switches 
 
6.1 Mathematical Model 
 
Consider the case of a triplex system, in which the failures of each subsystem are modelled by IID (independent, 
identical) exponential distributions, with a constant failure rate λ. This is the modelling approach taken by Goodall et al 
(2006), and a full derivation can be found therein. The system can be described by a state machine, with parameter S, 
equal to the number of units currently non-operational, or in repair. The system starts at time t=0 with S=0, meaning all 
units are fully functional. When a unit fails, the state becomes S=1, with a response and repair time given by τ. 
Provided there are no further failures, the system will progress through this state, returning to S=0 after time τ. τ could 
be considered an IID exponential distribution in the same way, or else a constant target which is the maximum allowed 
repair time, as here, in order to indicate a lowest availability bound (assuming the target is met). If a further failure 
occurs, then S=2, and an operational failure is considered to have occurred, necessitating an emergency response. This 
is described in the state diagram shown in fig. 4.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Plots showing variation of asset Availability vs MTTR (a, left) and MTBOF (b, right) for a traditional 
switch installation 
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The availability is still given by Eqn. (2b). The MTBOF value is now derived from the state machine model as below. A 
full derivation of this formula is provided in Goodall et al (2006), but excluded herein for brevity: 
 
   MTBOF  = 1/(3λ(1-e(-2λτ))) + 1/(2λ)     (4) 
  
There are now several assumptions made about the system:  
a) That there is no scheduled maintenance apart from a weekly visual inspection (as in Table 2 ID1, and 
mandated by law) and a 5-yearly replacement of worn track elements (ID3), but at 3hr possession cost due 
to t the concept utilising redesigned rail ends that can be quickly changed without major work to the 
structure of the switch. 
b) That the probability of failure during this 5-yearly, 3 hour maintenance window is negligible and can be 
ignored for simplicity. 
c) That the λRepoint, the subsystem failure rate, is higher than λTraditional for two reasons. Firstly, there is no 
scheduled maintenance. Secondly, the condition monitoring system has a necessarily high sensitivity (and 
subsequent false positive rate) in order to isolate faulty units before they fail in use. A very conservative 
estimate is that: 
   λRepoint  = 20 * λTraditional       (5a)  
λRepoint  = 20 * 1/32003      (5b) 
    = 6.25 * 10-4 
c) The MTTR is estimated equivalent to a traditional switch (106 mins). This is again a conservative estimate, 
as the REPOINT system is designed to have line-replaceable units to make repair almost instantaneous. 
 
 
6.2 An asset management approach  
 
Section 2 introduced τ, the time in which a maintenance team must fix any failed components, and return the switch to 
a S=0 state. For a system without parallel redundancy of active components, the asset is out of use during this period, 
and the target τ must be as small as possible as it is equivalent to MTTR (see section 5.2). If we assume each subsystem 
failure is treated as an emergency, as now, then using Eqns. (2a) and (4), values for the MTBOF and availability of a 
Repoint switch under the current maintenance/response regime can be calculated: 
 
   MTBOF  = 1/(3λ(1-e(-2λτ))) + 1/(2λ)     (6) 
    = 2.43*105(hours) (=27.6 years) 
 
Availability  = (MTBOF / (MTBOF + MTTR)) - (5/8766)   (7) 
  = 0.99992 
Fig. 4: State transition diagram for a triplex system, as per Goodall et al (2006). 
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The REPOINT approach shows a MTBOF an order of magnitude higher than traditional solutions. Availability has 
improved to ‘four nines’ standard, though largely through the removal of scheduled maintenance due to the ability to 
run-to-failure for individual subsystems. Whilst such availability may be attractive to most infrastructure 
owner/operators, of equal interest may be the labour saving.  The labour hours to achieve such availability are again 
given by Eqn. (3a/b): 
 
Labour_time = Maintenance_time + Transit_time + Emergency_response_time (8) 
= ∑Fi* tm_peryear + ∑Fi*2tt + ((λRepoint) * (MTTRhours + tt))  (9) 
    = ~16.4hours/year   
 
However, the labour value above is again misleading in that it still relies upon teams being on standby to respond to 
faults. By selecting a value of τ many times longer than the emergency repair time, flexibility is increased, and teams 
formerly on emergency standby can build replacing individual units into the daily, weekly or monthly maintenance 
plan. Figure 5 shows a plot of τ, in hours, against availability for values of τ up to 4 weeks. This indicates a ‘three 
nines’ availability, equivalent to existing installations, can be achieved with a 525h τ policy. It is, of course, up to the 
local asset manager to decide the particular value of τ and therefore labour spend vs availability, but the plot in Fig.5 
shows all values are an order of magnitude higher than the traditional solution. This demonstrates that the REPOINT 
approach, even with very conservative estimates, can offer savings in maintenance costs alongside improved 
availability across a range of possible maintenance staffing scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
A concept for a novel track switch arrangement has been developed at Loughborough University, which, through a 
novel locking arrangement, allows parallel, multi-channel actuation and locking functions for the first time.  This 
paper has demonstrated, through mathematical modelling and conservative assumptions, that an increase in switch 
availability is possible alongside a corresponding decrease in ongoing maintenance intensity using the REPOINT  
switching concept. The results show that for a REPOINT installation, gains in system availability are possible even 
when response times are set many times longer than currently achieved, indicating a significant reduction in ongoing 
maintenance cost. 
 
8. Future Work 
Fig. 5: Availability achieved for a given τ value, in hours. ‘Three nines’ is still achieved with a 525h maximum 
replacement time. 
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The work presented herein is a first approximation for a piece of modelling work regarding the operational 
performance of a REPOINT installation, for which there are, in reality, many more variables. In particular, the 
individual failure rates shall be modelled as IID exponential distributions, and the measure of maintenance intensity τ-1 
shall be used to model the cost saving possible from a parallel subsystems, run-to-failure maintenance regime, through 
the use of monte-carlo simulation. An important measure to be deduced from τ will be the number of maintenance 
teams necessary, for a given geographical area, to give a level of availability equivalent to existing practice.  
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